Challenging Medical Ghostwriting in US Courts by Bosch, Xavier et al.
Essay
Challenging Medical Ghostwriting in US Courts
Xavier Bosch
1*, Bijan Esfandiari
2, Leemon McHenry
3
1Department of Internal Medicine at the Hospital Clı ´nic and the Institut d’Investigacions Biome `diques August Pı ´ i Sunyer, University of Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain, 2Law
Firm of Baum, Hedlund, Aristei & Goldman, Los Angeles, California, United States of America, 3Department of Philosophy, California State University, Northridge,
California, United States of America
Introduction
Complaints about the ethics of medical
ghostwriting have increased in the last
decade, but little has changed [1–14].
Corruption of the scientific literature
through ghostwriting persists in medicine
due to the enormous profits for all
stakeholders [15], including the pharma-
ceutical industry that creates the publica-
tion strategy, academic researchers acting
as key opinion leaders (KOLs) for indus-
try, universities employing KOLs, medical
journals and their proprietors, including
medical societies and publishers, and
medical communication companies em-
ploying ghostwriters.
Ghostwriting openly infringes academic
standards and, in many cases, as recently
argued by Stern and Lemmens in PLoS
Medicine, contributes to fraud [16]. Typi-
cally, the practice involves industry-fi-
nanced writers generating articles that
either promote the sponsor company’s
products or discredit competing ones, with
eventual authorship credited to academic
researchers who provide little or no input,
thereby concealing industry involvement
and contributing to distorted drug profiles.
In the United States, cases relating to
gabapentin [17], rofecoxib [2], paroxetine
[7], sertraline [18], fenfluramine/phenter-
mine (fen-phen) [19], and Prempro [3] are
well documented, while many others,
relating to rosiglitazone, olanzapine, que-
tiapine, valdecoxib, and celecoxib, re-
main under seal by the courts. These
cases demonstrate the dangers inherent
in permitting pharmaceutical companies
to maintain the status quo.
Some editors, fully aware that ghost-
written manuscripts are submitted to their
journals, refuse to police their content
[20]. Although other journals, most nota-
bly PLoS Medicine, as well as several editors’
associations have produced policies against
the practice, in some cases adopting clear
and visible positions, little has changed
[1,6,11,21–23]. In addition, despite efforts
to reinforce authorship and publication
requirements, journals’ responses to ghost-
writing remain unsatisfactory, as shown by
a recent study of 630 articles from six high
impact medical journals [24]. In 2008, the
overall prevalence of articles with honor-
ary authorship, ghost authorship, or both,
was 21.0%, which represented a decline
from 29.1% in 1996. Although the prev-
alence of ghost authorship showed a
significant decline, there was no change
in the prevalence of honorary authors
relative to 1996 [24]. This study conclud-
ed that inappropriate authorship remains
a significant problem in high impact
biomedical publications.
Indeed, even the policies adopted by the
International Committee of Medical Jour-
nal Editors have failed to clarify how the
corruption of medical literature could be
curtailed [14]. Substantial contribution to
manuscript design or drafting is of little
significance when marketing messages are
planted in the ghostwriter’s first draft
well before a nominal author is selected.
Authors may give approval when the
paper is submitted for publication, but
this only occurs after the sponsor company
has ensured the manuscript meets its
marketing goals and the legal department
has transferred ownership to the submit-
ting author. The manuscript and message
are therefore controlled by the company
rather than the nominal authors [3,7].
Since self-regulation has not produced
results and the government has failed to
have any significant impact, we argue that
the only remaining option is the legal
system. Building upon the recent Stern
and Lemmens article that proposed
viewing ghostwriting as fraud [16], this
Essay expands on the possible legal
remedies for medical ghostwriting that
can help outlaw a practice that has long
tainted journal content and jeopardized
patient safety.
Legal Remedies for Medical
Ghostwriting
Stern and Lemmens recently advanced
various legal theories under which ‘‘guest
authors’’ can be held accountable, includ-
ing filing an action under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) [16]. They opined that monetary
damages could include a reduction in the
subscription value of the journal publish-
ing ghostwritten articles. They concede
individual damages would be nominal but
suggest that potential liability and reputa-
tional harm may curb ghostwriting. We
endorse this novel theory and the other
theories (i.e., fraud on the court) Stern and
Lemmens advance. We question, how-
ever, whether a law firm would undertake
the Herculean task of filing RICO actions
against guest authors when the potential of
recovery (even if aggregated and trebled)
would be, in litigation values, fairly modest
and nominal. In reality, the transactional
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the theories, and the nominal damages at
issue would likely discourage law firms
from prosecuting such cases.
We fully agree with Stern and Lemmens
that the legal system could be effective in
curbing ghostwriting, and suggest the fo-
llowing models of liability.
Personal Injury and Wrongful
Death Damages Caused by the
Guest-Authors’
Misrepresentations
Guest authors lending their names to
ghostwritten articles touting the safety and
efficacy of a drug have an independent
duty to exercise ordinary care and prevent
injury to others as a result of their conduct
[25]. As the influential Justice Benjamin
Cardozo noted long ago: ‘‘It is ancient
learning that one who assumes to act, even
though gratuitously, may thereby become
subject to the duty of acting carefully, if he
acts at all.’’ [26] When US courts have
considered misrepresentations that impli-
cate a risk of physical harm to others, they
have often looked to the rules set forth in
the Restatement Second of Torts, sections
310 and 311 [27].
Sections 310 and 311 of the Restate-
ment allow injured third parties to recover
from a person who has made an inten-
tional and negligent misrepresentation
inducing action that involves a risk of
physical harm [28]. The Restatement
emphasizes that liability ‘‘extends to any
person who, in the course of an activity
which is in furtherance of his own
interests, undertakes to give information
to another, and knows or should realize
that the safety of the person or others may
depend on the accuracy of the informa-
tion’’ [29].
The following hypothetical case, which
is applicable to many real world events,
illustrates how liability can be established:
A drug manufacturer conducts a study
whose primary endpoints show the study
drug poses serious risks and is not effec-
tive. The drug manufacturer manipulates
the data and creates post hoc secondary
and tertiary endpoints to create favorable
outcomes. Once a favorable outcome is
created, the manufacturer hires a ghost-
writing firm to draft an article falsely
touting the purported benefits of the drug
and failing to disclose the side effects. The
manufacturer then retains various KOLs
and reputable university professors to lend
their names and credentials to the drafted
article. The article is published in a widely
read medical journal and physicians begin
to prescribe the drug in reliance on the
article’s claims and the ‘‘authors’’’ reputa-
tions. Placebo responses help mask efficacy
issues, but some patients begin to suffer
from the undisclosed side effects—which
in many cases cause serious and fatal
injuries. Under these circumstances, the
injured patients and their families sue the
manufacturer for injuries and death
caused by the drug’s side effects. The
guest authors, however, are never named
as defendants. We argue that when an
injured patient’s physician directly or
indirectly relied upon a journal article
containing false/manipulated safety and
efficacy data, then pursuant to the legal
authority outlined above, the authors of
that article, including guest authors, are
legally liable for patient injuries and could
be named as defendants.
Accordingly, guest authors should know
that the information to which they have
affixed their name (and purportedly ‘‘au-
thored’’) will be relied on by other medical
professionals to make treatment decisions
and that, should the information be false,
the patients receiving the drug are placed
in peril. Guest authors cannot claim
immunity from the law by stating that
they relied on data summaries presented
by the pharmaceutical company. Such
facts would fall squarely within the ele-
ments of liability outlined in Sections 310
and 311 of the Restatements discussed
above. Even if the prescribing physician
never actually read the ghostwritten article
but its messages were relayed to him or her
by colleagues, under established case law,
the prescriber can be deemed to have
relied on the ghostwritten article [30]. We
therefore recommend that in cases where
patients are harmed as a result of a
pharmaceutical manufacturer’s fraudulent
representations involving ghostwritten ar-
ticles, serious consideration should be
given to naming as defendants the guest
authors who lent their names to the
misrepresentations.
In a few current pending pharmaceuti-
cal mass-tort litigations, plaintiffs’ lawyers
have begun naming ghostwriting firms
such as Excerpta Medica, Inc. and Else-
vier, Inc. as defendants [31], although we
are aware of no published decisions or
cases in which guest authors have been
named as defendants. The transactional
costs involved in naming guest authors as
defendants are minimal given that a suit
will already be pending against the
manufacturer. The potential damages at
issue can be significant and will depend on
the plaintiff’s injury and the egregious
nature of defendants’ conduct. Such po-
tential liability serves four purposes. First,
guest authors will be held accountable for
their fraud and negligent conduct. Second,
they will be confronted with the conse-
quences of their actions and will have to
answer at pre-trial depositions and at trial.
Third, this will, we hope, force guest
authors to review the data and indepen-
dently confirm the conclusions prior to
lending their names to articles drafted for
Summary Points
N Despite growing concern about medical ghostwriting, pharmaceutical compa-
nies, universities, medical journals, and communication companies employing
ghostwriters have thus far failed to adequately stem the problem. As a result,
some commentators have proposed that legal remedies could be sought by
patients harmed by drugs publicized in ghostwritten papers.
N In this Essay, we build on a recent analysis by Stern and Lemmens in PLoS
Medicine to outline specific areas of legal liability.
N For example, when an injured patient’s physician directly or indirectly relies
upon a journal article containing false or manipulated safety and efficacy data,
the authors, including guest authors, can be held legally liable for patient
injuries.
N In addition, guest authors of ghostwritten articles published by Medicare- and
Medicaid-recognized peer-reviewed medical journals used as clinical evidence
for indications for off-label uses may be liable under the federal False Claims Act
for inducing the United States government to reimburse prescriptions under
false pretenses.
N Paying guest authors of ghostwritten papers may influence clinical judgment,
increase product sales and government health care costs, and put patients at
risk by misrepresenting risk-benefit. Therefore, both physicians and sponsor
companies may be liable under the federal Anti-Kickback Statute.
N Although guest authors and pharmaceutical defendants may argue a First
Amendment right to participate in ghostwriting, the US Supreme Court has
firmly held that the First Amendment does not shield fraud.
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guest authors realize they could be per-
sonally liable for the bodily injuries
resulting from their misrepresentations,
they and other potential guest authors will
be deterred from engaging in such uneth-
ical and illegal behavior.
False Claims Act
In addition to the claims for personal
injuries caused by the guest authors’ fraud,
should the article constitute illegal off-label
promotion by the pharmaceutical compa-
ny, then the guest author may be held
liable potentially as a conspirator under
the federal False Claims Act (FCA) [32].
The FCA has effectively been used by
private persons and the federal govern-
ment to prohibit off-label promotion
when company representations encour-
aged health care professionals to submit
false payment claims to government health
care programs. As recently reported by
Kesselheim et al. [33], private individual
actions under the FCA (also known as qui
tam actions) allow company insiders and
others with special knowledge of potential
violations to initiate legal actions, which
the government may join or take over. In
particular, the FCA qui tam provision
permits a private person, known as a
relator, to file a lawsuit on behalf of the US
government, on grounds that he or she has
information that the named defendant has
intentionally submitted, or instigated the
submission of, false or fraudulent claims to
the United States [34]. The relator, who
need not have been personally affected by
the defendant’s demeanor, stands to re-
ceive a portion (usually about 15%–25%)
of any recovered damages. A qui tam suit
initially remains under seal for at least 60
days, during which the Department of
Justice can investigate and decide whether
to join the action.
This bounty system has acted as a
powerful enticement in a variety of health
settings, leading to a wellspring of FCA
litigation [35], and such claims have
become a usual feature of trials for off-
label promotion [36,37].
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA) governs drug safety; under it,
manufacturers are forbidden from directly
marketing a drug for a use other than the
FDA-approved indication [38]. Under the
FCA, lawsuits have been brought for
FDCA violations against drug companies,
based in part upon the company’s utiliza-
tion of ghostwritten articles to support
illegal off-label use that induces physicians
to prescribe medication for unapproved
uses. In 2004, Pfizer pleaded guilty to
charges that its Warner-Lambert unit
flouted federal laws (FDCA and FCA) by
promoting non-approved uses for a drug,
alleging it used an illegal marketing stra-
tegy to drive up sales. Pfizer paid US$430
million in settlement, including US$24.6
million to the whistleblower who first
reported the marketing manipulations.
The lawsuit alleged that the Neurontin
(gabapentin) marketing campaign includ-
ed compensating doctors for putting their
names on ghostwritten articles, paying
them hefty speakers’ fees, and covering
the costs of ‘‘educational’’ trips at lavish
resorts [39,40].
Obtaining formulary coverage for off-
label drug uses in the US can be especially
hard, but approval can be advanced by
articles supporting off-label use. If ghost-
written articles published by Medicare-
and Medicaid-recognized peer-reviewed
medical journals are used as clinical
evidence to establish medically accepted
indications for off-label drugs, they are
arguably inducing prescriptions to be
written and paid for by the US govern-
ment under false pretenses. The ghost-
written articles may then form the basis for
FCA claims [41,42].
FCA inflicts civil liability against per-
sons or entities presenting false payment
claims or using false records or statements
to get claims paid or approved or causing
third parties to do so. Statutory damages
include up to US$11,000 per false claim
submitted (i.e., per each reimbursement
submitted for an off-label indication), plus
3-fold damages for the government [43]. If
the ghostwritten article causes physicians
to prescribe a drug for off-label use to
patients on government assistance, the
prices paid by the government for these
off-label prescriptions can be obtained as
damages (and trebled) in a successful FCA
prosecution. The potential that participat-
ing in a ghost authored article can result in
liability for conspiracy under the FCA may
be another deterrent to the unethical
practice of guest authorship.
Liability under the Anti-
Kickback Statute
If it is established that, in consideration
of prescribing the manufacturer’s drug,
the manufacturer agreed to the naming of
the physician as a guest author, such
arrangements would violate the federal
Anti-Kickback Statute [44], the primary
federal law governing physician-manufac-
turer consulting provisions. Enacted to
protect Medicare and Medicaid programs
against inappropriate use of services and
unnecessary expenditures, it criminalizes
suppliers inducing the use of products or
services by providing remuneration to
ordering physicians who knowingly offer,
pay, solicit, or receive remuneration (in
cash or kind, directly or indirectly, overtly
or covertly) to induce (or in exchange for)
the prescribing, purchasing, or recom-
mending of goods or services reimbursable
by any federal health care program [45].
Since paying physicians to become
honorary or guest authors of a ghostwrit-
ten paper may influence their clinical
judgment, subsequently increasing prod-
uct sales (and government health care
costs), and putting patients at risk by
misrepresenting risk-benefit, both physi-
cians and sponsor companies may be
legally liable. The FCA, in conjunction
with the Anti-Kickback Statute, can also
be utilized to curb unethical ghostwriting.
Via the FCA, a claim can be filed on
behalf of the government by anyone
possessing information regarding the an-
ti-kickback violation and, if successful, the
claimant or ‘‘relator’’ can share in any
damages collected on behalf of the gov-
ernment. In addition, once the govern-
ment is apprised of a kickback violation,
the Department of Justice may bring
criminal actions against violators of the
Anti-Kickback Statute. Classified as a
felony, the maximum individual punish-
ments are fines of up to US 25,000   and
imprisonment for up to five years [46].
Furthermore, individuals guilty of violat-
ing the statute can be excluded from
participation in government programs
such as Medicare and Medicaid [47].
The threat of civil and potential criminal
prosecution is another potential manner of
curbing guest authorship, especially when
it is the result of reciprocal agreements
between physicians/guest-authors to pre-
scribe the drug and manufacturers prom-
ising to use the physician as a guest author.
No Recourse to the First
Amendment
In their defense, guest authors and
pharmaceutical defendants may try to
argue they have a First Amendment right
to participate in ghostwriting. The US has
a rich history of protecting anonymous
speech, especially in the area of political
speech [48]. However, the same level of
protection does not apply to commercial
speech, i.e., speech promoting the safety/
sale of a drug. Moreover, the US Supreme
Court has firmly held that ‘‘the First
Amendment does not shield fraud’’ [49]
and courts have consistently rejected such
First Amendment arguments in cases in
which drug companies have been sued for
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$fraudulent or off-label promotion [50].
Accordingly, the First Amendment should
not provide any sanc-
tuary to guest authors and pharmaceutical
companies engaged in fraudulent com-
mercial speech.
Conclusion
In addition to openly infringing aca-
demic standards and contributing to fraud,
the crisis of credibility resulting from
medical ghostwriting persists in published
reports on the efficacy and safety of pro-
posed treatments. The situation is so dire
that the public is forced to seek judicial
intervention to curb dangerous, unethical
medical ghostwriting. Stakeholders, inclu-
ding universities, journals, pharmaceutical
companies, and academic KOLs, have
largely failed to heed public calls for
honesty in reporting clinical research.
Since these complaints have fallen on deaf
ears, we believe the courts now have the
task of restoring the integrity of the
medical literature.
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